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International Shoe holding which involved a state test of "doing business".
As can be seen from the Lone Star case, as well as the instant case, it has
come to be accepted that the International Shoe formula applies to juris-
dictional problems in both the federal and state courts. 26 Why this rule
concerning the constitutional limits of state jurisdiction should be relevant
in cases concerning federal jurisdictional questions has never been made
clear. One court maintained that it imposes a fifth amendment due process
limitation on federal jurisdiction, yet that same court failed to shed any
illumination on the nature of this limitation. 27 Whatever the reason, the
fact remains that the International Shoe criteria is in essence the under-
lying principle of the cases which cling to a federal test, thus making the
distinction between the state and federal jurisdictional tests largely aca-
demic. Removed from the judicial haze of its inception into the sunlight
of reality, this judicially created "distinction" vanishes.
William F. Coyle
CONFLICT OF LAWS-WRONGFUL DEATH STATUE-REFUSAL TO
APPLY DAMAGE LIMITATION OF FOREIGN WRONGFUL
DEATH STATUTE.
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc. (N.Y. 1961).
Plaintiff's intestate, a resident of New York, purchased an airplane
ticket in New York from defendant, Northeast Airlines, Incorporated. The
flight originated in New York and ended in a crash at Nantucket, Massa-
chusetts, in which intestate was killed. Both Massachusetts and New York
have wrongful death statutes, but the former's statute limits recovery to
fifteen thousand dollars. Plaintiff, administrator of decedent's estate, brought
suit in New York and sought to circumvent the Massachusetts recovery
limitation by alleging, along with a first count in tort, a cause of action
in contract arising out of defendant's breach, through negligence, of an
implied contractual duty to carry decedent safely to his destination. The
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed the trial court's decision and
granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's contract cause of action.'
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of New York, with three judges concur-
ring in the result, affirmed, holding that the plaintiff could not sue for dam-
ages in contract for an alleged wrongful death which occurred in Massa-
26. Note, Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts Over Foreign Corporations,
69 HARv. L. Rzv. 508, 515 (1956).
27. Bach v. Friden Calculating Machine Co., Inc., 167 F2d 679 (6th Cir.
1948).
1. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 198
N.Y.S.2d 679 (App. Div. 1960).
C SE NOTES
1
Manashil: Conflict of Laws - Wrongful Death Statute - Refusal to Apply Dama
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1961
VILLANOVA LAW REVIhW
chusetts,2 but that plaintiff could recover under the Massachusetts wrongful
death statute, and New York public policy would not permit application of
the Massachusetts damage limitation. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
9 N.Y. 2d 34, 172 N.E. 2d 526 (1961).
Wrongful death actions, unknown to the common law,3 were initially
enacted to provide financial compensation for the survivors of persons who
were killed in accidents negligently caused by common carriers.4 As this
type of statute developed and gained acceptance, other potential wrong-
doers were added to the list along with common carriers until eventually
all wrongdoers became subject to this statutory form of tort liability.5
Though each individual wrongful death statute applies only within the
territorial limits of the enacting state, the cause of action created, like most
tort actions, is transitory. 6 A system of comparing the wrongful death
statute of the place of death with that of the forum developed in order to
determine if the two statutes were of similar character and import; this
test was devised to detect the opposition, if any, of the foreign statute to
the public policy of the forum.7 Substantial similarity formed the foundation
of the comparison, and dissimilarities in the amounts recoverable,8 or as to
the persons in whose names actions might be brought,0 were not con-
sidered important enough to permit the forum to refuse to apply the foreign
statute. Eventually, some courts abandoned the test of similarity as the
controlling factor in accepting or denying jurisdiction and adopted the
more general policy of accepting jurisdiction unless the foreign statute
clearly outraged the public policy of the forum.10 However, the problem of
dissimilar recovery clauses was not always decided solely on policy grounds
and, in these instances, discussion centered around the nature of recovery
clauses, that is whether they are to be considered an integral part of the
substantive law or merely a matter of procedure. The majority of courts
have treated the recovery clause which is set out in a wrongful death
statute as part of the substantive law and have applied that statute's
2. The court in dismissing the contract action concluded that: (1) plaintiff's
cause of action which alleged breach of contract was nothing more than a disguised
tort claim and therefore the only relief which plaintiff could obtain would be limited
to a tort action upon proof of negligence; (2) decedent's cause of action for injuries
did not survive his death; (3) plaintiff's tort claim was therefore limited to a
wrongful death action; (4) wrongful death actions derive from statute only
and the controlling statute is that of the lex loci delictus.. Kilberg v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 198 N.Y.S.2d 679 (App. Div. 1960).
3. This fact was expressed by Cardozo, J. in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224
N.Y. 99, 104, 120 N.E. 198, 199 (1918).
4. Id. at 105, 120 N.E. at 199.
5. Ibid.
6. Id at 107, 120 N.E. at 200.
7. Kiefer v. Grand Trunk Ry., 12 App. Div. 28, 42 N.Y.S. 171 (1896) ; Leonard
v. Columbia Steam Nay. Co., 84 N.Y. 48, 52, 53 (1881); McDonald v. Mallory, 77
N.Y. 546, 550 (1879).
8. Keep v. National Tube Co., 154 Fed. 121 (3d Cir. 1907).
9. Davidow v. Pennsylvania R.Co., 85 Fed. 943, 944 (2d Cir. 1898); Boston &
M.R. v. McDuffey, 79 Fed. 934, 936 (2d Cir. 1897).
10. Hanlon v. Frederick Leyland & Co., 223 Mass. 438, 111 N.E. 907, 908(1916) ; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
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damage clause." This issue, however, was settled by a small minority of
courts by calling recovery procedural (or remedial) and applying the
law of the forum.12 The law of the forum was sometimes used to limit
damages below (but never increase them above) the amount allowed
by the law of the place of the wrong on the ground that plaintiff waived
his right to greater damages by electing to sue in a jurisdiction where
local policy restricted recovery;13 this has been particularly true where
the defendant was domiciled within the forum.14
In Hughes v. Fetter, 15 the United States Supreme Court recognized
that a wrongful death act is a "public act" within the protection of the
full faith and credit clause,' 6 but also that this clause does not auto-
matically require a state to enforce a foreign act if local public policy is
strongly opposed to its application. It held, however, that, in* the event of
a state's refusal to enforce such a foreign statute, the Supreme Court
could and should weigh the conflicting policies involved and make an
independent determination of whether or not there was in fact a substantial
basis in policy for such refusal. In Broderick v. Rosner,1 7 the Supreme
Court decided that New Jersey was required to enforce a New York
stockholders liability act on the theory that a state ". . . may not, under
the guise of merely affecting the remedy, deny the enforcement of claims
otherwise within the protection of the full faith and credit clause, when its
courts have general jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties."
[Emphasis added]. In the instant case, the court does not deny general
jurisdiction, but rather it treats the question of damages as remedial; the
majority claims that this finding as to the nature of damage clauses is
demanded by New York's strong public policy against arbitrary limita-
tion of damages. 18
By applying the Massachusetts statute while refusing to apply the
limitations imposed by it, the New York Court is, in effect, giving local
policy an extraterritorial effect. Also, the majority decision could be
viewed either as an absolute refusal to apply the Massachusetts statute
when the plaintiff is a citizen of New York and the amount in contro-
versy exceeds fifteen thousand dollars, or as the creation of a new cause
11. Powell v. Great Northern Ry., 102 Minn. 448, 113 N.W. 1017, 1019 (1907).
See also, Annot. 15 A.L.R.2d 765, 766.
12. Wooden v. Western N.Y. & Pa. R.Co., 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1050 (1891).
However, one must consider the criticism of the Wooden case in Justice (then
Judge) Cardozo's majority opinion in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., note 3, supra,
where he discussed the fact that the Wooden decision restricted recovery against a
local resident and concluded that ". . . the authority of the Wooden case does not
extend beyond the specific point decided." See also, Annot. 15 A.L.R.2d 767, 768.
13. Armbruster v. Chicago, R.I. & P.Ry., 166 Iowa 155, 147 N.W. 337, 340
(1914).
14. Wooden v. Western N.Y. & Pa. R., 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1050, 1051 (1891).
15. 341 U.S. 609, 71 S. Ct. 980 (1951).
16. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
17. 294 U.S. 629, 55 S. Ct. 589 (1935).
18. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 529, 198
N.Y.S.2d 679 (App. Div. 1960).
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of action in Massachusetts for wrongful death claims involving more than
fifteen thousand dollars. In either case, its position would seem to be
a dubious one. The ability of a court to apply a foreign statute and
ignore the damage limitation found therein has been severely criticized on
the theory that an obligation and its extent are inseparable when the
only source of that obligation is the lex loci delictus.'9 This reasoning
is shored up by the common sense notion that it would be unjust to
allow a plaintiff to go into his own state court ". . . absolutely depending
on the foreign law for the foundation of his case and yet to deny the
defendant the benefit of whatever limitations on his liability that law would
impose."'20 Assuming that it was necessary to decide not to give force
to the Massachusetts recovery limitation, 2' the majority claims the sup-
port of three factual propositions to form the basis of its present policy
decision: that there are no prior decisions to the contrary which are
binding on the forum; that New York abolished its limitations on re-
covery with the adoption of the state constitution in 1894;22 that it is
unjust to subject a travelling citizen of New York to the arbitrary damage
limitations of other states when the place of injury might be, as in the
instant case, entirely fortuitous. 23 The United States Supreme Court
ultimately may be called upon to decide the full faith and credit question
posed by the instant case by balancing the opposing policies involved.
2 4
It would seem, after carefully weighing these opposing policies, that the
three-tier foundation of New York's refusal to apply the Massachusetts
recovery limitation is not sufficiently strong to support and justify such
a refusal. Certainly, New York has an interest in the welfare of its
citizens even when they are beyond its borders, but this interest alone
would not seem to justify injecting an unlimited recovery clause into the
wrongful death statute of Massachusetts, whose legislature not only created
the source of plaintiff's cause of action and defendant's liability, but who
also saw fit to limit the latter to fifteen thousand dollars.
Ned W. Manashil
19. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 34 S. Ct. 955 (1914);
Faron v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 193 Misc. 395, 84 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1948).
20. Slater v. Mexican Nat. R., 194 U.S. 120, 126, 24 S. Ct. 581 (1904).
21. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 529-530,
198 N.Y.S.2d 679 (App. Div. 1960). Judge Fuld's concurring opinion indicated that
the only question for review was whether or not the judgment dismissing plaintiff's
contract cause of action should be affirmed or reversed and that the issue concerning
the measure of damages was not properly before the court at this time.
22. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 18.
23. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 528-529,
198 N.Y.S.2d 679 (App. Div. 1960). Perhaps this third reason could encourage the
New York courts to apply New York's wrongful death legislation in favor of a
New York resident who had been killed in a jurisdiction having no such statute.
24. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611, 71 S. Ct. 980, 981, 982 (1951). Con-
cerning the problem of when a state's local policy must yield to a conflicting act of
another state, Mr. Justice Black announced the opinion of the Court that ". . -. it is
for this Court to choose in each case between the competing public policies involved."
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